The way back: "By 2 May 1972, the entire province of Quang Tri ... had fallen to the NVA. ... threatened Hue ... the Americans responded with a rapid build-up of air power within South Vietnam and with forces offshore. ... Seventh Fleet deployed elements of III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) ... 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB), ... The initial tasks of the fleet's amphibious forces had been to provide MACV security and emergency evacuation for ULSL forces should the need arise. ... the ULSL had four amphibious ready groups off Vietnam, totaling 16 ships under the command of Rear Admiral Walter D. Gaddis in the USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19). ... the crux of the problem was obvious, "the almost total disconnect between the air war and the ground war... The Americans had to get their houses in order before they could hope to help the Vietnamese. ... In 1975 the Center for Naval Analyses studied this period ... presence of moderately sophisticated antiaircraft weapons hampered U.S. abilities to provide close and direct air support, adverse weather ... naval gunfire played a vital role in compensating for air support ... " [36]

NVN stalled: "Stunned by this attack at the rear, the NVA quickly rallied and, on 21 May, mounted a full-scale armor and infantry attack on the My Chanh Line. ... The Marines had suffered heavy casualties, but by nightfall, had restored the line." "At 0100, 22 May, the NVA launched a tank-infantry attack against the 3d VNMC Battalion. They had the initiative and could "smell blood, one American advisor reported. ... the enemy penetrated deeply into friendly territory ... This action marked the first time the ground TOW system had been fired in combat. ... 8th VNMC Battalion counterattacked, the enemy fled the battlefield ... The My Chanh Line was intact. ... " [37]