This paper seeks to explain why electoral malpractice takes the form it does in the Western Melanesian countries of Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands. It uses cross and within case variation in the two countries to argue that the form and extent of electoral malpractice is a product, foremost, of three political economies. The first of these is a national political economy which produces incentives for Members of Parliament in both countries to neglect electoral process and systems. The second political economy is an international one, in which aid actors are afforded some power to serve as a countervailing force to a domestic tendency towards decaying electoral capacity. The third political economy is localised, to do with power and how campaigns play out in individual electorates. Thanks to weak national systems there is considerable scope for actors to engage in malpractice at a local level, although local-level balance of power, and something akin to local political culture, causes the degree of localised malpractice to vary considerably.

Discussant: Dr. Peter King (University of Sydney) Chair: Dr. Ferran Martinez i Coma (University of Sydney)

The Electoral Integrity Project is an independent research team based at the University of Sydney and the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. It explores many issues, focusing upon three main questions:

- When do elections meet international standards of electoral integrity? - What happens when elections fail to do so? - And what can be done to mitigate these problems?